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<C-AB>Abstract: %RUVERRPHWDO¶VIRUPXODWLRQSURYLGes an opportunity for a fundamental 
rethink about the ³brain disease model´ of addiction that dominates research, treatment, policy, 
and lay understanding of addiction.  We also demonstrate how the American opioid crisis 
provides a contemporary example of how ³brain disease´ is not moderated by the environmental 
context but is instead crucially dependent upon it.  
 
<C-Text begins> 
The dominant explanation of addiction (substance-use disorder) is that it is an acquired brain 
disease (Leshner 1997; Volkow et. al 2016). In recent years, many academic researchers, 
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clinicians, and philosophers have objected to this characterization (e.g., Davies 2018; Heather 
2018; Heather et al. 2018; Levy 2013; Lewis 2017; Satel & Lilienfeld 2014). We commend 
Borsboom and colleagues for outlining a convincing alternative to biological reductionism as an 
explanation for mental and behavioral disorders. In this commentary, we outline how their 
approach provides the foundation for a fundamental rethink about the role of the brain in 
addiction, one that is able to retain many of the important contributions of neurobiological 
research to our understanding of the disorder without the requirement to accept the ³greedy 
UHGXFWLRQLVP´(Dennett 1995) LQKHUHQWLQWKH³EUDLQGLVHDVHPRGHORIDGGLFWLRQ´Volkow et al. 
2016). 
 
First, consideration of %RUVERRPHWDO¶VQRWLRQVRIrational relations and intentionality 
highlights the lack of explanatory power of the brain disease model of addiction. Current brain 
disease model of addiction accounts are able to characterise the molecular, structural, and 
functional adaptations in distinct brain regions that are correlated with distinct symptoms or 
³stages´ of addiction, that is, multiple overlapping ³brain diseases.´ For example, Volkow et al. 
(2016) distinguish three recurring stages of addiction, each of which has a distinct neural 
substrate: (1) binge and intoxication, characterised by rapid learning about the incentive-
motivational properties of the drug and associated cues; (2) withdrawal and negative affect, 
characterised by hyposensitivity of the brain reward system and an exaggerated stress response; 
and (3) preoccupation and anticipation, characterised by impaired decision-making and inability 
to resist strong urges. 
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Borsboom et al.¶V notions of rational relations and intentionality can be applied to make 
VHQVHRIWKHDGGLFW¶VEHKDYLRXUDQGKRZLWLVUHODWHGWREXWQRWIXQGDPHQWDOO\GHWHUPLQHGE\WKH
underlying neurobiological changes. For example, regarding intentionality, within the 
³withdrawal and negative affect´ stage, one must invoke intentionality in order to understand 
why the addict uses the drug to manage negative mood (because the drug has provided short-
term relief in the past), and why medications that can alleviate withdrawal symptoms, such as 
nicotine replacement therapy or methadone, can reduce tobacco smoking and opiate use, 
respectively (Mattick et al.  2009; Stead et al. 2012). Regarding rational relations, to give one 
example, the observed ³impaired control´ over substance use seen in the ³preoccupation and 
anticipation´ stage (stage 3) can be understood as a direct consequence of increased valuation of 
the drug coupled with reduced valuation of alternatives (to drug use) that characterise stages 1 
and 2, respectively (Berkman et al. 2017; Heyman 1996). Thus, there is no requirement to 
interpret the observed structural and functional changes in prefrontal brain regions as indicative 
of ³impaired ability to resist strong urges´(Volkow et al. 2016). Our point is that attempts to use 
neurobiological changes to explain behaviour can lead to very misleading explanations that are 
contradicted by behavioural data.  
 
Second, consideration of intentionality can account for an important observation about 
the long-term course of addiction: Most addicts eventually recover from addiction, and most of 
those that recover do so without any treatment (Heyman 2013). If addiction is an acquired 
chronic brain disease, how can this be so? Demonstrations that addicts are less likely to recover 
if they believe that they suffer from a chronic disease (rather than, for example, an unhealthy 
habit that could be overcome; see Eiser & Van der Pligt 1986;  Eiser et. al 1985; Miller et al.  
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1996) make sense when viewed through BorsboRPHWDO¶VIUDPHZRUN$ddicts can change their 
behaviour and give up drugs, but only if their attributions for their addiction permit them to do 
so.  
 
FLQDOO\ZHVXJJHVWWKDWWKHFXUUHQW³RSLRLGFULVLV´LQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVSURYLGHVD
pertinent demonstration that addiction can be primarily determined by the broader social, 
environmental, cultural, and historical context (cf. Hart 2013). The origins of this crisis 
coincided with the de-industrialization, economic decline, and urban decay in the ³Rust Belt´ 
and Appalachian regions (Quinones 2016). Together with alcohol poisonings, suicide, and 
chronic liver disease, increasing death rates from opioid overdose occurred among middle-aged, 
white, non-Hispanic men and women of low educational levels ± the so-called ³deaths of 
despair´ (Case & Deaton 2015).  There is also a strong inverse correlation between levels of 
³social capital´ in United States counties and age-adjusted drug overdose mortality (Zoroob & 
Salemi 2017). More generally, there is evidence that deaths and emergency department visits 
related to opioid use vary with macroeconomic conditions (Hollingsworth et al. 2017).  
 
It could perhaps be argued that these variables exert their effects on rates of addiction 
merely by increasing the prevalence of drug use, so that more people are susceptible to the brain 
changes that then lead to the development of addiction. But in our view it is far more likely that 
the variables in question are significant elements in the kind of broad causal network that 
%RUVERRPHWDOGHVFULEH)RUH[DPSOH³SHRSOHGLVFRYHUWKDWRSLRLGVDUHDQH[FHOOHQWVKRUW-term 
balm for existential maladies like self-loathing, emptiness, erosion of purpose, and isolation. 
Years of heavy use condition people to desire drugs at the ILUVWVWDERIGLVWUHVV´6DWHO	
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Lilienfeld 2017). So, too, the easy availability of opioids, whether by prescription from local 
medical practitioners or through the skillful marketing of illicit suppliers (Quinones 2016), make 
attempts at behavioral change less likely, and relapse (if change is attempted) more likely to 
occur. The overarching point is that these broad contextual determinants should be regarded as 
part of the casual nexus of the disorder of addiction, not merely as ³social factors´that might 
moderate the expression of an underlying brain disease.  
<C-Text ends> 
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